AUTHOR: AKANKSHA TIWARI
Throughout history, the maritime domain has been a critical place for building new and emerging powers, impacting regional dynamics and the larger security architecture. Today’s great power struggle is no different. With the rise of China across the Indian and Pacific oceans and the region constituting almost two-thirds of the world’s GDP, the Indo-Pacific inevitably becomes the new geographic space representing the new strategic reality of the twenty-first century. The Indo-Pacific region is geographically vital since it connects all major countries in the Indian Ocean, including Singapore, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, and other maritime nations. India’s current government believes in issue-based partnerships, which explains the country’s extensive involvement in the Indo-Pacific region.
India’s decision to join the Indo-Pacific region is threefold. First, China’s growing presence has jeopardized New Delhi’s position as a regional power and security provider. The lack of strategic competition in the region helped India establish itself as the primary security provider for many of its neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. These countries gradually perceived New Delhi as the dominant security player in South Asia and the Indian Ocean thereby welcoming China as a preferable alternative. Secondly, better infrastructure and connectivity models are becoming increasingly important in Asia. The lack of alternatives to fulfill the rising demand for infrastructure led to many welcoming Beijing’s investments. It finally resulted in substantial growth in Chinese engagements and presence in the Indian Ocean region and throughout South Asia. When the Sri Lankan government leased the Hambantota Port to China and Colombo leased it to Beijing, India’s concerns about unsustainable debts to finance ambitious projects culminated in an economic and strategic threat since this places Beijing in uncomfortably close proximity to India’s maritime neighborhood. Finally, India’s reluctance to engage meaningfully with its island neighbors, such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, worked as a catalyst for China’s involvement in India’s neighborhood.
Approaches and Partnerships
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is built on two pillars, strengthening its national engagement with the region, and stronger partnerships with like-minded nations. As a result, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) began taking steps to address its shortcomings in island diplomacy. In 2016, India established the Indian Ocean Region Division (IOR) inside the MEA, which brings together the island states of the Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka for better coordination of the Indian Ocean activities and policy. The division signaled a shift in India’s foreign policy strategy, emphasizing the importance of the maritime domain in the country’s international activities. India’s approach after Prime Minister Modi’s address at Shangri-La in 2018 was more in terms of shared values and interests, laying out the prospects of an Indo-Pacific theatre. Since time immemorial, partnerships have played a critical role in India’s foreign policy. Australia, France, Japan, and the United States emerged as the pillars of India’s Indo-Pacific partnerships. Other significant players include Africa, Indonesia, and Singapore; organizations like ASEAN and the European Union, and island communities across the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, and the Caribbean. The way India manages its relations with Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates also has an impact on both its own priorities and the global security architecture.
With Japan, in 2015, India unveiled the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure program, which aims to promote sustainable, high-quality, and cost-effective infrastructure as a viable alternative to Chinese projects. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a project primarily considered a direct opposition to China’s Maritime Silk Road, was launched in 2016 by New Delhi and Tokyo to highlight the potential and necessity of connecting Asia and Africa. India and Japan have also collectively announced projects such as a port in the southern city of Chabahar, Iran, and a terminal in Sri Lanka to face the security challenges.
With Australia, the Indo-Pacific served as an opportunity for India to enhance its existing relationship by building close bilateral and trilateral relationships such as adding a fourth ‘C,’ Coal, to its existing ‘Commonwealth, Cricket, and Curry’ relationship. Moreover, the launch of the trilateral Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) along with Japan and Australia can act as a potential alternative to Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The SCRI is an indirect move to reduce the over-dependence on Chinese imports. It is committed to promoting trade facilitation by supporting the utilization of digital technology and holding investment promotion events to provide opportunities for stakeholders to explore the possibility of diversification of their supply chains.
India increased cooperation with France and the United States. France and India launched the International Solar Alliance to promote renewable energy and combat climate change. India is also a part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) along with Australia, Japan, and the United States, an initiative proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe in 2007 to join forces against the growing Chinese belligerence in the region. The Quad seems to be more vital than ever to de-escalate the ever-increasing tensions arising from Chinese aggression. Over time, the Quad members have increased their cooperation and signed and announced security and economic agreements. Given the growing cooperation among the Quad and Quad-Plus countries, the need to ensure freedom of navigation, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, energy preservation, regional capacity building, territorial connectivity, economic transparency, assistance to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, and the development of financially viable alternatives to Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy is of shared concerns.
In Europe, the association has mainly been dominated by trade. Both the European Union and India commonly vouch for the maintenance of order and support the role and significance of all existing regional institutions, specifically the Indian Ocean Rim Association, ASEAN, and others. The primary area of interest is maritime security and infrastructural development. The relationship between India and Europe provides New Delhi with new partners and resources that are vital to facing contemporary challenges. To strengthen this connection, New Delhi has made significant efforts to reconnect with the European nations, through the European Union and also on a bilateral basis.
Furthermore, the competition between India and China has made the African coastline on the Western Indian Ocean a strategic location. Regarding maritime security, the Indian navy is raising its footprint in the Western Indian Ocean via humanitarian assistance and capacity building. New Delhi, as a step to increase cooperation with the region, has declared the inauguration of eighteen new missions to give a boost to the political and strategic interest of the region. Along with this, several other efforts have also been made by the Indian government to strengthen its relationship with the African region, which includes initiating involvement with the Arab Gulf Nations- specifically Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The Act East Policy of India (AEP) is a highly diplomatic policy undertaken to ensure the promotion of cultural, economic, and strategic relations with Asia Pacific regions. In 2014 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the Act East Policy the economic condition of India was robust and the global profile was much higher than what it was during the Look East Policy of 1991. Narendra Modi brought in new techniques to intensify economic, strategic, and diplomatic relations with countries that share common interests with India.
After the end of the cold war in 1991 major changes were brought by countries in Asia. India also brought in several changes in its policies, firstly adoption of economic reforms of 1990 brought in major development strategies. Secondly, after the thawing of the cold war, India adopted multiple foreign policies which helped to make economic and strategic ties easier with the United States. This relationship between India and the US led to the signing of the historic civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008. Lastly, in 1992, the Look East Policy was introduced as a response to new challenges coming it’s way. India’s relation with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, and now Australia shows the vast network of institutional structures which lent support for bilateral arrangements. PM Modi gave huge importance to the need to expand relations beyond bilateral ambit which proves the involvement of India in the development of trilateral relations of India-US- Japan and also involvement in quadrilateral meetings with the US, Japan, and Australia since 2017. The essential objectives of Act East Policy include promoting economic cooperation and increasing interaction among the North-East Indian States. The Act East Policy also works to find out alternatives for traditional business partners. Lastly, it tries to curb the increasing impact of China on the ASEAN region. Under the AEP the government relies on 3 Cs primarily, Culture, Connectivity, and Commerce for development.
Conclusion
To conclude, Indo-Pacific locations are extremely important to India since the Indo-Pacific has been dubbed a “new theatre of competition,” with India positioned as one of the key players in the twenty-first century. However, describing and displaying India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has been difficult, particularly due to geopolitical constraints. The transformation in New Delhi’s foreign policy was one of India’s most significant challenges. Second, China’s ascent and increased partnership in India’s neighborhood have produced substantial concern in political calculation. Finally, the Sino-Indian rivalry has led to a shift in foreign policy exchanges.
It is safe to say that the Indo-Pacific holds immense importance for India. The primary usage of such a platform can be useful for sharing assessments of Chinese capabilities, intentions, and operations, and suggesting plausible ways to counter such provocations. The secondary benefit that can be exploited out of this alignment is maritime security and economic cooperation, given the growing understanding among the Indo-Pacific countries. Moreover, cyber-security, vaccination distribution, and climate change have also been the talks of shared concern.
*“The views expressed in the article are author’s personal and are not endorsed by the Global Policy Consortium (GPC) or assumed by their members”
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